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Trade Secrets and Confidentiality: Attorney Ethics in the
Silent World of Tax Planning
I. INTRODUCTION
As multi-disciplinary practice become increasingly acceptable, a
range of ethical and legal problems also becomes increasingly common.
Since the legal profession has only recently developed some tolerance for
multi-disciplinary practice, many of these ethical and legal problems
remain unsolved. This comment addresses one such problem involving
confidentiality agreements between attorneys and accounting and
financial planning firms. Specifically, this comment discusses the issues
involved when accounting and financial planning firms claim either trade
secrets protection for, or a proprietary interest in, tax-planning strategies,
and the potential ethical problems involved when attorneys bind
themselves to confidence regarding such strategies. This comment uses
as its basic fact scenario an ethical analysis provided by the Illinois State
Bar Association:
Accounting Firm tells Client A that Accounting Firm will disclose to
Client A a package of ideas that can significantly reduce Client A’s
taxes if: (1) Client A pays Accounting Firm a fee for the information
and (2) Client A and Client A’s Lawyer each enter into a
confidentiality agreement pursuant to which Client A and Lawyer agree
to never divulge the idea in the package.1

Part II of this comment deals with trade secrets problems involved in
this transaction, exploring whether an accounting or other financial
planning firm may claim a proprietary interest in aggressive new
strategies for minimizing tax liability, considering that such strategies
become available and work only within the context of the publicly
accessible Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Part II also deals with the
question of whether the law should protect the use of these strategies by
attorneys.
Part III of this comment deals with the contracts, ethics, and public
policy issues arising from this transaction. This section discusses
whether an attorney unethically creates a conflict of interest between her
client for whom she signs the confidentiality agreement and her other
1. Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, No. 00-01 (2000).
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clients who do not have dealings with the outside firm. It also addresses
whether such an agreement unethically restricts the attorney’s ability to
practice law and whether the attorney signing such an agreement
unethically assists the accounting firm in the unauthorized practice of
law. Finally, Part III examines public policy concerns arising from thirdparty beneficiary liability.
II. TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION FOR TAX-PLANNING STRATEGIES
An increasing number of accounting firms2 seek to protect their
strategies by claiming a proprietary interest and keeping them secret.
[M]any financial advisers, in their efforts to woo new clients and retain
old ones in today’s hotly competitive industry, are harnessing a
marketing tool more familiar to people who sell soap or software.
Treating certain strategies and the documents used to implement them
as intellectual property, they are trying to slow the speed with which
materials describing them leak into the public domain. To do that,
accounting firms, insurance companies, investment banks, and some
law firms have asked clients and other advisers to sign [confidentiality
agreements]. The premise behind these agreements is that the marketer
has something that amounts to a trade secret: confidential information
3
that could give them a competitive edge.

Thus accounting firms use confidentiality agreements to protect what
they consider proprietary secrets. Part III of this comment deals directly
with the issue surrounding confidentiality agreements. Because the law
protects trade secrets even in the absence of such agreements, Part II
considers only trade secret issues. Further, even when the information
the firm seeks to protect does not benefit from trade secrets protection, a
confidentiality agreement may still protect the accounting firm’s interests
in the information. Thus, the issues surrounding the information’s trade
secrets status and the issue surrounding the confidentiality agreements do
not necessarily converge, and this comment deals with them as separate
problems arising from separate bodies of law.
A. Overview of Trade Secrets Law
The first question centers on the formal status of theses tax-planning
strategies and whether they rise to the level of trade secrets the law will
protect. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), adopted in thirty-four

2. This comment will refer solely to accounting firms. However, for convenience I use this
term to refer to the whole range of non-attorney firms within the financial planning industry.
3. Deborah L. Jacobs, When Mum’s the Word, BLOOMBERG WEALTH MANAGER, Dec.
2001/Jan. 2002, at 66.
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states and the District of Columbia in one form or another,4 defines a
“trade secret” as follows:
“Trade secret” means information, including formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.5

Thus, for trade secrets law to protect an idea, the idea must produce
an economic advantage to the proprietor by virtue of its secrecy.6 This
definition also requires “reasonable” efforts by the proprietor to protect
the secret from public disclosure.7 Finally, to constitute a trade secret
under this definition, another person must not have the ability to readily
ascertain the idea without resorting to improper means:
[In order to recover, a] plaintiff claiming misappropriation of a trade
secret must prove that: (1) the plaintiff possessed a trade secret; (2) the
defendant is using that trade secret in breach of an agreement,
confidence, or duty, or as a result of discovery by improper means; and
(3) the defendant’s use of the trade secret is to the plaintiff’s
detriment.8

The UTSA definition, however, does not precisely answer the
question of how “unknown” the secret must be in order to receive trade
secrets protection. Case law has developed to produce general guidelines
in resolving this question. For example, in Nebraska, and New York
case law holds that “[a] trade secret is something known to only one or a
few, kept from the general public, and not susceptible of general
knowledge.”9 Further, “[i]f the principles incorporated in a device [and
presumably in an idea or process] are known to the industry, there is no
trade secret which can be disclosed.”10

4. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act has Been Adopted
(1985).
5. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4) (1985).
6. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek,
Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1199 (5th Cir. 1986).
7. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4).
8. 54 AM.JUR. 2D, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 1114
(1996) (citations omitted).
9. Selection Research, Inc. v. Murman, 433 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Neb. 1989). See also
Abdallah v. Crandall, 76 N.Y.S.2d 403, 406 (1948) (following Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph
Co., 138 N.E. 485 (N.Y. 1923)).
10. Murman, 433 N.W.2d at 532. See also Garner Tool & Die v. Laux, 285 N.W.2d 219
(Neb. 1979); Wilkin v. Sunbeem Corp., 466 F.2d 714 ( 10th Cir. 1972).
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This final guideline produces a split in authority regarding whether a
court should protect an idea that is susceptible to “reverse engineering”
by others using principles “known to the industry.” Some jurisdiction
will not protect such an idea whether or not the defendant in fact
discovered the idea using generally known principles.11 On the other
hand, some jurisdictions will protect the “idea person”12 to the extent that
the defendant, while capable of reverse engineering the secret through
the use of generally known principles, nevertheless used improper means
to obtain the secret: “The fact that a trade secret is of such nature that it
can be discovered by experimentation or other fair and lawful mean does
not deprive its owner of the right to protection from those who would
secure possession of it by unfair means.”13 Misappropriation of a trade
secret is, after all, a tort and the law seeks both to reward the idea person
for her creativity and to punish the tortfeasor for wrongdoing.14 Those
jurisdiction that protect the idea person to the extent the defendant used
improper means will nevertheless allow reverse engineering if the
defendant invested the capital necessary to arrive at the idea independent
of the idea person’s knowledge of it and investments to develop it.15
B. Can Tax Strategies Be Protected?
Accounting firms claim the protections outlined above for a wide
variety of tax strategies, including:
everything from income-tax strategies—for example, deferring taxes,
creating deductions, changing the tax basis of property, or converting
ordinary income to capital gain—to wealth-transfer tools and
techniques for financing life insurance. . . . The deal may involve a
novel technique or one that is being widely used but that each firm
executes with a slightly different twist.16

These firms do not charge an hourly fee, but instead charge a premium
for the use of such strategies thus bringing in revenue that far exceeds the
initial investment to develop the strategy.17

11. See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985), aff’d 772 F.2d 896
(3d Cir. 1985).
12. The term “idea person” refers to the inventor or developer of a proprietary idea. I use this
term to refer either to the actual individual responsible for the idea’s creation, or to the firm or entity
claiming ownership of the idea from its inception.
13. Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 224 N.W. 2d 80, 89 (1974) (quoting HARRY D. NIMS, UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS, § 148 (1947)).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 66.
17. Id.
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Accounting firms that seek to protect tax-planning strategies with
trade secret laws implicate the difficult questions and splits of authority
outlined in Part IIA above. Notably, tax-planning strategies necessarily
involve principles generally known in the financial and estate planning
industries. For example, trust, gifts, business entities, tax deferral
mechanisms, a wide variety of investment vehicles, and so on constitute
the basic grammar of tax planning. Anyone initiated into the world of
tax planning knows the basic principles of these mechanisms, which
work and must be understood within the context of the Internal Revenue
Code.
Thus, a very difficult question arises from the outset regarding
whether the strategies that accounting firms seek to protect rise to the
level of trade secrets as a matter of law.18 After all, the industry knows,
and for the most part thoroughly understands, all of the tools and
principles involved in tax planning and lacks only knowledge of the
exact combinations of these tools and principles used to benefit a given
profile of clients. Of course, some authority suggests that even where all
the individual components of a trade secret receive general circulation in
the industry, the law will still protect the particular combination of the
elements. “The fact that some or all of the components of the trade
secrets are well-known does not preclude protection for a secret
combination, compilation, or integration of the individual elements.”19
The point here is that tax-planning strategies have a very particular
character within the world of proprietary idea.
Some advisers . . . question whether there really are all that many new
and proprietary ways to make money for clients or save them a bundle
on taxes. With everybody reading the same law, court cases, and IRS
rulings, “it’s only reasonable to assume that people think in parallel
terms and can come up with the same or similar solutions to a
problem.”20

A plaintiff may not be able to make a very strong argument that there
is a trade secret involved where the defendant has the skills necessary to
devise the strategy on her own. Further, the proprietor must show that
the strategy is virtually unknown in the industry. A showing that the
industry does not generally know the strategy does not give rise to the

18. Accordingly, most firms do not seek to rely solely on trade secrets law, and seek instead
to impose confidentiality agreements on all those to whom the firms disclose the strategies. This
comment analyzes these confidentiality agreements in Part III as the central and most important
issue.
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995).
20. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 72. (Arthur Meyers is “a lawyer and employee-benefits specialist
with Hutchins, Wheeler & Ditmar in Boston.”). Id at 66.
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existence of a trade secret. Put differently, a strategy that is mostly
unknown “may not be converted into confidential information merely by
accumulating the information by one’s own efforts.”21 Since the plaintiff
in a tort action has the burden of proving misappropriation, it seems very
unlikely (or at least immensely difficult) that any firm could prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that the strategy exists only as the result
of the plaintiff’s efforts, that no one else in the industry knows the
strategy, that the defendant did not develop the idea, and that the
defendant obtained the strategy through improper means.
Generally, an action for misappropriation of a secret tax-planning
strategy will ensue under facts similar to those recited in the introduction,
and thus, there often will arise no question as to the circumstances
surrounding disclosure of the strategy—the plaintiff will probably prove
that the plaintiff did in fact disclose the strategy to the defendant.
However, this does not resolve whether use of the strategy after such
disclosure constitutes “improper means.” A court must determine the
impropriety of the means of acquisition (in this case, acquisition from the
accounting firm) within the context of the other questions listed above,
namely whether others in the industry know the strategy, and whether the
plaintiff’s disclosure of the strategy constituted the only way the
defendant could have learned it and in fact did learn it. This determines
whether the strategy is a trade secret, which then bears on whether the
defendant’s later use of the idea becomes improper. In other words, when
a lawyer learns a tax-planning strategy from an accounting firm, the
propriety or impropriety of the use of that strategy depends largely on
whether the industry knows the strategy, and whether she could have
learned the strategy in any legitimate way other than by the disclosure in
question. The accounting firm’s efforts to keep the strategy secret, even
coupled with a lack of general circulation in the industry, does not settle
the propriety question until the court determines that the strategy rises to
the level of trade secret.22
In those jurisdictions requiring actual investment in the reverse
engineering process to avoid misappropriation liability, the problem is
compounded because developing a tax-planning strategy may require a
great deal more time and effort for some than for others, depending on
the relative skill of the professional. An elite tax planner may require
virtually no investment in time or effort to develop the strategy,
protesting that all tax planners are not created equal, and might create it
in a matter of seconds. A court could not rationally impose on this elite
21. 54 AM.JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Practices § 1115 (1996).
22. I admit that this uses woefully circular reasoning, but this appears to be the general
malaise of the entire body of trade secrets law.

PETERSON-MACRO

163]

TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIALITY

2/21/2003 4:06 PM

169

planner the duty to invest to the same degree the plaintiff invested in
order to escape liability.
These problems all point to the difficulty involved when trying to
prove a proprietary interest in a tax-planning strategy that would give
rise to trade secret protection. The second major problem, however,
deals with whether a firm may claim a proprietary interest as a matter of
law. This problem arises from the economic realities of tax planning.
Deborah Jacobs reports in Bloomberg Wealth Manager that often the
strategies accounting firms seek to claim as a propriety interest either
already circulate widely in the industry or do not work anyway, given
that the accounting firm does not have the expertise necessary to analyze
many of the legal problems invoked by the strategy.23
Aside from these specious attempts to claim a proprietary interest,
what about the case of a genuinely novel strategy, developed through
actual investment, and which the would-be proprietor genuinely believes
to be virtually unknown in the industry? Would trade secrets law protect
these strategies?
Certainly the usual lengths to which accounting firms go to protect
the strategy’s secrecy constitute “reasonable efforts” within the meaning
of the UTSA use of that term.24 Firms place clients and their attorneys
under confidentiality agreements not to disclose the content of these
strategies, and these agreements require money to draft. Surely a firm
would not invest money, time and effort into protecting the secrecy of a
strategy the industry already knows. Some jurisdictions hold that efforts
to protect the idea’s secrecy constitute “evidence that the secret has real
value.”25 Such evidence does not end the inquiry, however, because it
does not give rise to a presumption that the plaintiff in fact has
something of “real value” to protect.26 Such a presumption would
produce absurd consequences because anyone could create a trade secret
surrounding any bit of common knowledge so long as she went to some
lengths to keep the “idea” secret.
Instead, the amount of effort in maintaining the secret constitutes
only evidence of value, but not conclusive evidence.27 A court must still

23. See generally Jacobs, supra note 3.
24. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii).
25. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Dev. Indus. Inc. 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991).
26. Id.
27. Given the discussion below that tax strategies might in fact never be novel and largely
known in the industry, these efforts to keep such strategies “secret” more likely amount to
advertising schemes in which firms hope to attract clients by offering them something which their
neighbors do not know, something dangerous, something cutting edge. In other words, the
confidentiality efforts probably reveal more about the psychic value of these strategies than their
economic and trade secrets value.
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inquire into the industry workings and realities to determine whether the
firm has something worthy of trade secrets protection. In the financial
planning industry, such an inquiry may prove devastating to accounting
firms’ proprietary claims.
Developers know few strategies remain secret for long, but they hope
to profit from a head start. . . . Many advisers . . . think information
circulates so quickly they won’t have to wait long to learn about a
technique through other channels. “My network is so good that I could
probably find out the strategy on my own,” says Albert Gibbons,
president of AIG Financial Services in Phoenixville, Pa., who adds that
colleagues have given him materials he knows were subject to
confidentiality agreements. “Would my client have to wait another
week or another months or another 90 days?” he asks. “Nothing’s
28
going to hold out much longer than that.”

If Jacobs is correct that even the developers of tax-planning strategies
have no expectation that their strategies will remain a secret for longer
than a few weeks, then the claimed proprietary interest may not meet the
UTSA requirement that the secret must “[derive] independent economic
value . . . from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use.”29 Jacobs’ article seems to
indicate that proprietors in fact expect other practitioners to obtain the
strategies within a very short time, and that they hope only to gain as
much economic advantage from the strategies as they can before the
inevitable general disclosure.
Of course, the proprietors will argue that this meets the very essence
of the UTSA requirement that the secret must give the proprietor an
economic advantage while it remains secret. The other side of this
argument, however, is that the UTSA, in the same sentence, requires that
the secret not be “readily ascertainable by proper means.”30 As
demonstrated above, determining what constitutes proper means under
the circumstances must involve a highly fact-specific inquiry and
somewhat circular reasoning. Perhaps the best approach to solving this
problem, then, would be to ask, “What does the industry generally do?”
This question, of course, would very likely end in the answer that tax
planners have nothing of “real value” to protect from other in the
industry, given the general understanding of virtually all the principles
and tools involved in tax planning and the relative speed and inevitability
with which strategies disseminate. The Massachusetts Superior court,
28. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 66, 70.
29. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985).
30. Id.

PETERSON-MACRO

163]

2/21/2003 4:06 PM

TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIALITY

171

speaking in dicta, said that insurance providers and other businesses
engaged in the sale of financial products “are hardly the kinds of
businesses deeply steeped in trade secrets and other truly confidential
materials.”31
This inevitable and speedy dissemination of tax-planning strategies
also gives rise to a third major problem for an accounting firm in
claiming trade secret protection: “the defendant’s use of the trade secret
[must be] to the plaintiff’s detriment.”32 In other words, the use of the
secret must cause the plaintiff to lose the economic advantage which the
secret otherwise afforded her. In an industry where the economic
advantages of the strategies have very short shelf lives, damage
calculations may prove very speculative and uncertain. This not only
imposes enormous difficulty on a court to determine how much, if any,
damages to award, but in fact undercuts the plaintiff’s proprietary claim
to a trade secret which gives her an economic advantage, as required by
the UTSA.
C. Should Tax Strategies Be Protected?
The above analysis does not suggest that no case will ever rise to the
level of a trade secret that the law should protect. This comment merely
intends to emphasize the difficulty of asserting such a claim in the
context of tax planning, given the realities of the industry. Nevertheless,
no court should use the above analysis to decree a blanket presumption
against trade secret protection in then case of a tax-planning strategy.
Instead, courts must determine the genuineness of a claimed trade secret
on a case-by-case basis. Courts must make this determination with an
eye toward the policy concerns involved in trade secrets law generally,
but with care to consider the overall character of tax-planning strategies
that makes them unlikely candidates for trade secrets protection.
III. CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS WITH ACCOUNTING FIRMS
Either from a recognition of the weak position of tax-planning
strategies in trade secrets doctrine, or out of an attempt to bolster the
trade secrets position by increasing efforts to keep them secret, or for
both reasons, accounting firms generally do not rely solely on the
protection afforded by trade secrets law. Instead, they rely heavily on

31. Kruanelis v. Sentinel Benefits Group, Inc., No. CA000487C 2000 WL 33159206, at *1
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000).
32. 54A AM. JUR. 2D, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 1114
(1996) (citations omitted).
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confidentiality agreements to bind clients and clients’ attorneys to silence
in order to protect the claimed proprietary interest.
The increasing use of confidentiality agreements during the past five
years coincides with the growth of multidisciplinary efforts, in which
advisers in various fields team up to better serve the client. Yet these
agreements have strained relationships new and old as recipients have
divided into two camps: those who will sign and those who won’t.33

At least two broad categories of problems make the prospect of
signing such an agreement unpleasant at best and potentially devastating
to an attorney’s career and her clients’ interests at worst. First,
confidentiality agreements potentially suffer from serious contract
problems, possibly lacking definiteness and therefore enforceability.
Second, confidentiality agreements put the attorney who signs them into
very dangerous ethical territory, creating potential conflicts of interests
between her clients, imposing unreasonable duties on potential clients,
and restricting the free flow of competent legal advice.
A. Contract Problems
1. When the attorney signs an agreement: indefiniteness
When offering to divulge a secret tax-planning strategy to an
attorney in exchange for a signed confidentiality agreement, accounting
firms generally phrase their promise like this, “The technique . . . could
produce significant saving . . .” or the accounting firm has “developed a
new, proprietary estate-planning technique that could save [the client]
money in transfer taxes.”34
In this transaction, the accounting firm (the promisor) clearly
bargains for the attorney’s (the promisee’s) confidentiality in order to
earn the fees from the client. No doubt a court would find this contract
to have consideration. However, this contract probably lacks sufficient
definiteness in the promisor’s promise, making the return confidentiality
promise unenforceable.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:
(1) Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be
understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract
unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain. (2) The terms of

33. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 66.
34. Id. at 66, 67.
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a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining
the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.35

Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, a leading case in certainty and definiteness, states the
rule as follows: “Although the terms and requirements of an enforceable
contract need not be stated in minute detail, it is fundamental that, in
order to be binding, an agreement must be definite and certain so that the
liability of the parties may be exactly fixed.”36 Farnsworth explains
“examples of agreements that do not meet the [definiteness] requirement
are those in which the description of the subject matter is inadequate, as
in the case when the description or quantity of goods to be sold is
lacking.”37 In other words, for a contract to be certain or definite enough
to support an enforceable contract, it must describe in reasonably clear
terms what exactly the promisor promises, such that a court can
determine whether the promisor has fulfilled that promise.
In the case of an accounting firm promising to divulge a tax-planning
strategy in exchange for a confidentiality agreement, the promisee’s
return promise to remain silent regarding the strategy clearly meets the
definiteness requirement. A court can determine with reference to the
evidence at hand whether the attorney has revealed the strategy to
anyone else, including the attorney’s other clients. The problem of
definiteness lies only in the promisor’s promise to reveal a secret taxplanning strategy that will “benefit” the client or yield “significant
savings.”
This promise uses such vague terms that a court could hardly
determine whether the accounting firm has in fact tendered to the
attorney and her client a strategy as promised. The promise does not
describe anything about the means used in the strategy, or its ends in
potential tax savings. Were the court to set the standard such that any
benefit whatever to the client, even one cent in tax savings, fulfills the
promise to “benefit the client,” the court must then deal with even more
uncertainty in muddling through unconscionability doctrine. Instead, a
court that insists that this contract has sufficient definiteness would better
serve the interests of justice and the expectations of the promisee38 by
substituting the promisor’s expectations of what “benefit” or
“significant” means with the court’s or the promisee’s understanding of
what those terms mean. However, substituting the court’s judgment of

35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CERTAINTY § 33(1981).
36. Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
37. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.27 (1990).
38. The expectations of the promisee serve as a foundational principle in contract law
generally and definiteness doctrine specifically. Id. (“[T]he requirement of definiteness is implicit
in the principle that the promisee’s expectation interest is to be protected”).

PETERSON-MACRO

174

2/21/2003 4:06 PM

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume XVII

the meaning of such words produces its own problems because it forces
to court to write terms of definiteness into the contract that did not
appear there before litigation.
Accordingly, a court should hold this contract unenforceable for lack
of definiteness, in the absence of any clearer terms, such as “this strategy
could save your client up to $X.” A court might well require other
elements of definiteness to appear in the contract, such as a discussion of
the relative risk and aggressiveness involved in the strategy, particularly
if the terms of the agreement state something like “this strategy will save
your client $X.” A discussion of the relative risk and aggressiveness
would allow the promisee to know what she bargained for. Without such
a discussion, even if the strategy would in fact save the client the
promised amount, it might involve such a high degree of risk and
aggressiveness that no reasonable client, nor this client in particular,
would consider using such a strategy and would not therefore bargain to
receive such a strategy.
After requiring reasonable certainty in disclosing to the client and
her attorney enough details about the strategy that the contract becomes
enforceable, a new problem arises. Any discussion about the potential
savings and relative risk and aggressiveness would almost inevitably
involve some level of disclosure regarding the tools and combinations
involved in the strategy itself. This creates two problems. First, if
definiteness would require such disclosure, no accounting firm with a
truly novel, worthwhile, and proprietary strategy would make such
disclosure because such a disclosure would compromise the strategy’s
secrecy and thus would compromise the economic advantage which the
strategy gives to the firm. The disclosure would compromise the
economic advantage because now, in making the offer for a contract, the
firm has already made the disclosures it promises to make in exchange
for confidentiality. If a firm does make a sufficiently definite offer,
however, a second major problem arises in such contracts because now
the firm has already performed its promise before binding the promisee
to confidentiality. In other words, the accounting firm asks the client and
her attorney to bind themselves to confidentiality in exchange for past
consideration, and past consideration cannot support a contract.
Only if [the] action has not yet been taken when the promise is made
can the promisor be bargaining for it when making the promise. If the
action has already been taken, the promisor cannot be seeking to induce
it. Such ‘past consideration’ – action already taken before a promise is
made – cannot be consideration for the promise.39

39. Id. at § 2.7. Farnsworth cites several cases in support of this. “Plowman v. Indian Ref.
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Applying Farnsworth’s language to our scenario, the “promisor”
represents the client and her attorney, who promise to remain silent in
seeking to induce disclosure. If the promisee has already disclosed the
strategy by the time the attorney and her client promise to remain
confidential, then this past disclosure cannot constitute consideration,
supporting enforceability of the client’s and the attorney’s promises to
remain confidential.40 In fact, Jacobs reports that this scenario happens
frequently. “No matter what they say, when rich, ‘marquee’ clients are
involved, promoters ‘will disclose the substance, if not the details, of the
transaction to both the individual and his or her lawyer’ without a
confidentiality agreement, Meyers says.”41
Of course, courts must consider these promises on a case-by-case
basis in determining their definiteness. However, if the promise by the
accounting firm meets the definiteness requirement, the promisee runs
the risk of having disclosed too much, so that any promise by the client
and her attorney to keep the strategy confidential does not become an
enforceable contract for lack of consideration. Such confidentiality
agreements therefore swim in murky waters, and accounting firms may
find that they are damned if they do disclose and damned if they don’t.
The tension between the definiteness and consideration doctrines should
not imply, however, that no confidential agreement would ever have both
sufficient definiteness and consideration.
This comment simply
emphasizes the extreme unlikelihood and difficulty in satisfying both
requirements at the same time.
2. When the attorney refuses to sign an agreement: implied contracts
and confidential relationships
Aside from trade secrets protection and confidentiality agreements, a
proprietor may protect its strategy by claiming an implied-in-fact
contract with the person to who the proprietor discloses the idea,
requiring confidentiality.42 The court in Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline
Service Company outlined three distinct situations where ideas might be
Co., 20 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1937) (promise of pension held unenforceable); . . . Allen v. Bryson, 67
Iowa 951, 25 N.W. 820 (1885) (promise to pay for past legal services).” Id. at n.1.
40. This not only undercuts the enforceability of the accounting firm’s desired confidentiality
agreement, but it also potentially undercuts the firm’s trade secrets position. If the firm goes about
disclosing the strategy to potential buyers without first obtaining a confidentiality agreement, then
the firm may no longer claim that it has taken “reasonable” steps to maintain the strategy’s secrecy.
Without those reasonable steps to maintain secrecy, the law will not protect the strategy as a trade
secret. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (1985).
41. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 72.
42. See Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 926 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1996).
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disclosed to a recipient: (1) submission occurs by the idea person without
advance warning and without solicitation and before objection by the
recipient; (2) submission occurs by the idea person without solicitation
by the recipient, but the recipient allows the disclosure; and (3) “a
solicited submission.”43 Under the first two scenarios, a court will not
find an implied contract because an idea person cannot impose a
confidential relationship upon another without the other’s consent.44 The
third scenario, where the recipient asks for the idea person to disclose the
idea, “implies a promise to pay for the idea if the recipient uses it.”45
In the case of the tax strategy scenario, the accounting firm must
claim that the implied promised payment includes confidentiality. This
claim has enough problems in itself, and can only be resolved by
showing that not only did the recipients not object to receiving the idea,
but that they in fact solicited the idea or otherwise meant to be bound by
a confidentiality agreement. Accordingly, a court must ask whether the
client and her attorney knew or should have known that the strategy in
fact amounts to a trade secret.46 The necessity of this inquiry, in turn,
puts a heavy burden on the recipients to make the same conclusions of
law that a court will make about the trade secrets status of the strategy.
As previously noted, such an inquiry also presents a litany of pitfalls and
uncertainties. Moreover, the recipients must make this critical and very
difficult determination in an atmosphere of severely limited information
since the accounting firm will likely divulge at best incomplete details
about the strategy.
However, assuming that the accounting firm can demonstrate an
implied confidentiality agreement or a voluntary confidential
relationship, at least two additional problems arise. First, what
consideration does the proprietor furnish in exchange for an implied
agreement not to use or publish the idea? Second, what degree of
novelty must the idea involve for the law to protect it as a trade secret?
This comment has already demonstrated the difficulty in answering
the first question regarding consideration versus definiteness in
contracting for confidentiality in exchange for a secret tax-planning
strategy. The answer to the second problem, regarding what level of
novelty the law requires, depends on whether the accounting firm claims
a confidential relationship or an implied-in-fact contract. If the firm
claims an implied-in-fact contract, then a severe split in authority
suggests that courts may or may not demand a novel idea to support an
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 1140-41.
Id.
Id. at 1141.
See generally Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).
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California dispenses with the novelty

The policy that precludes protection of an abstract idea by copyright
does not prevent its protection by contract. Even though an idea is not
property subject to exclusive ownership, its disclosure may be of
substantial benefit to the person to whom it is disclosed. That
disclosure may therefore be consideration for a promise to pay.48

On the other had, New York still requires a novel idea, even in the case
of implied contracts, to support protection of an idea in trade secrets law:
“[W]hen one submits an idea to another, no promise to pay for its use
may be implied, and no asserted agreement enforced, if the elements of
novelty and originality are absent.”49 If the accounting firm claims an
implied contract in a state following the New York rule, the firm will
have a difficult time proving novelty, given the difficulty of showing that
the entire industry has no knowledge of the strategy, as noted in Part II
above.
On the other hand, if the accounting firm cannot successfully prove
an implied-in-fact contract, the accounting firm must rely on its last
resort, a confidential relationship. Under the Restatement of Torts,
“[o]ne who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to
do so, is liable to the other if . . . his disclosure or use constitutes a
breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret
to him.50
As the comment to this provision states, the proprietor of a trade secret
may not unilaterally create a confidential relationship without the
knowledge or consent of the party to whom he discloses the secret. No
particular form of notice is necessary, however; the question is whether
the recipient of the information knew or should have known that the
disclosure was made in confidence.51

A confidential relationship may thus arise where the recipients solicited
the idea, or at least knew or should have known the accounting firm
would disclose the idea in confidence and took no steps to stop it.
The existence of a confidential relationship does not prevent the
greatest problem in this case. Where the accounting firm approaches the
client and her attorney, offers to disclose the strategy, and the client and
47. See Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85, 35 Cal.2d 653, 674 (1950)
(Traynor, J., dissenting) (stating California law does not require novelty); but see Downey v. Gen.
Foods Corp., 286 N.E.2d 257, 259, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1972) (requiring novelty).
48. Stanley, 221 P.2d at 85 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
49. Downey, 286 N.E.2d at 259.
50. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(b) (1939).
51. Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1987).
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her attorney know that such confidential disclosures will occur in the
course of making a deal, most courts say a confidential relationship
arises.52 In this case, the accounting firm can claim breach of the
confidential relationship if the client or her attorney uses the strategy
without having paid the accounting firm for its use and because the
parties impliedly developed a confidential relationship.
Instead, the problem arises because most jurisdictions require a novel
idea to support a finding of a breached confidential relationship.53
Again, the strategies’ novelty will prove difficult to show. Thus, the
accounting firm will have a difficult time recovering damages for breach
of a confidential relationship.
To recover for breach of a confidentiality contract, the accounting
firm must prove the existence of either an express contract or an implied
contract. In the case of an express contract, the firm will struggle to
show both definiteness and consideration at the same time. In the case of
an implied contract, the firm will struggle with the same problems as in
the express contract context, but with the added burden in many
jurisdictions of proving a novel idea. In the absence of an express or
implied contract, an accounting firm may still recover for breach of a
confidential relationship, but with the very difficult burden of proving a
novel idea, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the action ensues or the
transaction occurred. This section demonstrates that, in any event,
accounting firms will always struggle to recover for breach of a
confidentiality agreement or for breach of a confidential relationship.
B. Ethical Problems
Even if an accounting firm succeeds in fashioning an enforceable
confidentiality agreement, ethical rules may still prevent an attorney
from binding herself to confidence. At least two major ethical rules enter
into this problem. First, such a transaction may impermissibly create a
conflict of interests between the client for whom the attorney signs the
agreement and the attorney’s other clients. Second, such a transaction
may impermissibly restrict the attorney’s ability to practice law.
1. Conflicts of interest
Under ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7(b), an
attorney may not enter into a transaction with one client that will
compromise the interests of the attorney’s other clients.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 788 A.2d 906, 916 (N.J. Super. 2002); Paul
v. Haley, 183 A.D.2d 44, 52, 588 N.Y.S.2d 897, 903 (1992).
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(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if . . . (2) . . . the representation
of [that client may] be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client . . . or a third person, or by [the
lawyer’s own interests], [unless]: (b)(1) the lawyer reasonably believes
the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client
consents after consultation. . . .54

The Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA) released an advisory
opinion in October 2000, interpreting Rule 1.7(b) in the context of the
fact scenario hypothesized above.55 In this opinion, the ISBA advised
that the attorney who enters into a confidentiality agreement in this
context impermissibly creates a conflict of interests between the clients
for whom the attorney signs the agreement and the attorney’s other
clients.
[T]he package of ideas (the ‘information’) includes interpretations and
applications of the tax laws and regulations that would be useful to
Lawyer in performing legal services for Clients B, C. and D. Thus, we
assume that once Lawyer has learned of the Information, she will be
prohibited from applying ideas that would directly assist her
representation of other clients. Based upon that assumption, if Lawyer
were to sign the Confidentiality Agreement, Lawyer would have a
conflict of interest in representing Clients B, C and D.56

Moreover, the ISBA opinion states that it doubts whether an attorney
could cure such a conflict by obtaining informed consent from the
attorney’s other clients.57 No client would likely give such consent when
the client knows that the attorney has useful tax-planning strategies that
could benefit the client.58 Even if the attorney could obtain such consent,
however, “it does not appear that [the attorney] could reasonably assume
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b). The American Law Institute proposed a
similar restraint on attorneys entering into relationships involving conflicts of interest.
§ 201. Basic Prohibition of Conflict of Interest. Unless all affected clients and other
necessary persons consent to the representation . . . a lawyer may not represent a client if
the representation would involve a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest is involved if
there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client would be materially
and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to another
current client, to a former client, or to a third person.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
1996)).
55. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1.
56. Id.
57. The ALI proposal also imposes a consent requirement to cure conflicts of interest.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 202 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1
(1996). However, “[n]otwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client or former client, a
lawyer may no represent a client if . . . (c) in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the
lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the clients.” Id. §
202(2)(c).
58. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1.
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that withholding material tax strategies would not adversely affect
Clients B, C, and D.”59
The ISBA opinion does not constitute binding ethical authority over
attorney conduct, nor does it represent the opinion of the majority of
state bar associations. However, the opinion soundly analyzes and
interprets Rule 1.7(b) within the Rule’s clear language. Given the facts
hypothesized above, it seems no good argument supports the conclusion
that an attorney could ethically sign an agreement if the attorney
presently represents other clients who could benefit from the proposed
strategy.60
2. Restraint on ability to practice law
However, what if the attorney does not presently represent other
clients who could benefit from the proposed strategy? The ISBA opinion
also draws from Rule 5.6 in support of its conclusion that signing a
confidentiality agreement under these facts would violate attorney
ethics.61 Rule 5.6 reads in pertinent part,
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a
partnership . . . [or] employment . . . agreement that restricts the rights
of a lawyer to practice after termination of a relationship . . . or (b) an
agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part
of the settlement of a client controversy.62

While the facts do not hypothesize an attorney who enters into “a
partnership or employment agreement,” the transaction may nevertheless
violate “the spirit of Rule 5.6.”63
The comments to Model Rule 5.6(b) explain that the rule was designed
to prohibit lawyers from entering into agreements that “restrict a
lawyer’s right to represent certain clients or to sue specific parties as
part of a settlement of a controversy.” ABA Formal Opinion No. 93371 cited three reasons for Rule 5.6(b):
First, permitting such agreements restricts the access of the public to
lawyers, who, by virtue of their background and experience, might be
the very best available talent to represent these individuals. . . .
Second, the use of such agreements may provide clients with rewards
59. Id.
60. One must never forget, however, that the strategy in question likely has no unique value
the attorney could not obtain for her clients in other ways. Thus, this discussion will remain largely
academic, affecting few, if any, clients’ interests. Accordingly, this ethical discussion focuses on the
unlikely situation where a confidentiality agreement would protect a legitimately valuable strategy.
61. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1.
62. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a), (b) (2002).
63. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1.
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that bear less relationship to the merits of their claims than they do to
the desire of the defendant to “buy off” plaintiff’s counsel. Third, the
offering of such restrictive agreements places the plaintiff’s lawyer in a
situation where there is conflict between the interests of present clients
and those of future clients.64

Accordingly, the ISBA opinion weighs the interests of future clients
against the immediate benefit that the present client could derive from
disclosure of the strategy.65 It concludes that the attorney may not
ethically create conflicts between the present client and the interests of
future clients, and that signing a confidentiality agreement in this
situation creates such conflicts of interests.66
Michael L. Shakman and Marc O. Beem criticize the ISBA opinion
in the Chicago Bar Association Record by responding that to disallow
the attorney from signing such agreements may negatively and unfair
impact the present client’s interests:
If the lawyer did not have other clients similarly interested in the
accountant’s idea when the accountant sought the lawyer’s agreement
to confidentiality, most of the reasoning of the Opinion suggests that
the lawyer could agree. . . . The reference in the Opinion to the spirit of
Rule 5.6 clouds this conclusion, for it focuses upon the “conflict
between the interest of Lawyer’s current Client A and those of future
clients who could benefit from the knowledge.” Rule 5.6 should not
control if the lawyer is to give proper weight to the interest of the
lawyer’s present client. That client wants immediate access to the
accountant’s presumably beneficial ideas, and is prepared to pay. That
client will be immediately prejudiced if use of the idea is withheld. It
seems difficult to justify such harm to a current client because of an
ethical rule focused on the interest of a potential future client, who may
or may not ever approach the lawyer at a time when the idea is still
67
relevant.

In other words, the present client’s interests are real, concrete,
immediate, and measurable, while the future clients’ interests are
hypothetical and speculative. Shakman and Beem argue that the ISBA
opinion, in allowing these hypothetical interests to outweigh the real
interests of the present client, dogmatically applies ethical rules in
unrealistic ways to the detriment of all clients presently in need of secret
tax-planning strategies.

64. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 93-371 (1993))
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Michael L. Shakman & Marc O. Beem, Can Lawyers Protect, and Sell at Premium, a
Secret and Valuable Idea?, 15 CHI. B.A. REC., July 15, 2001, at 49.
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Such a rule would prejudice all present clients who might have a need
for the confidential information and are willing to pay for it. These
clients would have to do without either the valuable information or the
assistance of a lawyer in the matter. The Opinion does not consider
this issue.68

This analysis fails to overcome the concerns outlined in the ISBA
opinion for at least two reasons: (1) it brazenly ignores the time-honored
ethical tradition that Rule 5.6 codifies and which virtually all states who
follow the ABA Model Rules accept; and (2) it wrongly assumes that the
secret strategies promoted by accounting firms necessarily have
sufficient worth that preventing a client from obtaining the strategies
would prejudice the client’s interests.
First, Shakman and Beem’s analysis disregards the policy concerns
and ethical traditions behind Rule 5.6. Citing the speculative and
unimportant interests of future clients,69 the analysis relegates Rule 5.6 to
a historical curiosity and a present ethical irrelevancy. Shakman and
Beem’s discussion of future client’s interests unfairly and incompletely
characterizes the purpose of Rule 5.6. Reasonable people may disagree
over the relative weight that the ethics rules give to the interests of
potential future clients compared with those of present clients. However,
those interests do not represent the entire policy behind Rule 5.6 and its
prohibition against attorneys binding themselves to agreements that
restrict their ability to practice law.70 ABA Formal Opinion 93-371 lists
three public policy interests protected by Rule 5.6 that are in addition to
future clients’ interests that Shakman and Beem apparently consider
inadequate to support the ISBA opinion’s conclusions.
First, permitting such agreements restricts the access of the public to
lawyers, who, by virtue of their background and experience, might be
the very best available talent to represent these individuals. . . .
Second, the use of such agreements may provide clients with rewards
that bear less relationship to the merits of their claims than they do to
the desire of the defendant to “buy off” plaintiff’s counsel. Third, the
offering of such restrictive agreements places the plaintiff’s lawyer in a

68. Id. at 51.
69. Id. at 49 (“It seems difficult to justify such a harm to a current client because of an ethical
rule focused on the interest of a potential future client, who may or may not ever approach the
lawyer at a time when the idea is still relevant.”).
70. In fairness to Shakman and Beem, the ISBA opinion itself focused only on the interests
of future clients as the sole principle behind this ethical dilemma. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 1.
(“The third reason [proffered by ABA Formal Opinion No. 93-371] applies in the situation at hand.
The terms of the Confidentiality Agreement would create a conflict between the interest of Lawyer’s
Current Client A and those of future clients who could benefit from the knowledge gained by
Lawyer from Accounting Firm.”). Shakman and Beem merely hone in on this limited analysis of the
ethical problem.
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situation where there is conflict between the interests of present clients
and those of future clients.71

Not only do future clients’ interests weigh against the present client’s
interests, but so do the general public’s interest in the free-flow of
competent legal advice, coupled with the danger of lawyers self-dealing
by entering into agreements restricting the availability of their advice.
Further, not only does an attorney self-dealing itself raise ethical
problems, but also it possibly inappropriately allows outside third parties
access to the all-important attorney-client relationship.
The first policy concern deals not only with the public’s (and by
implication future clients’) right to consult with this particular attorney,
but also with the public’s interest in the substance of the legal advice
itself. The law generally disfavors the restriction of trade, and imposes
ethical rules such as Rule 5.6 to curb the restriction of legal advice
particularly.
Although the secret strategies promoted by accounting firms will
generally provide little or no value to clients, a strategy which does
provide real value makes an even stronger case in support of disallowing
confidentiality agreements. The ISBA notes, “We have assumed that the
tax package to be disclosed by Accounting Firm to Client A contains
legal advice or analysis.”72 The next section deals directly with the
problems of attorneys assisting accounting firms in the unauthorized
practice of law. The problem here, however, rests in the fact that taxplanning strategies have the nature of legal advice, which public policy
should allow to flow freely from attorneys to the public.
The problem of future clients’ interests remains only academic,
Shakman and Beem seem to argue, and therefore, weighs lightly against
the interests of the present client. However, even assuming that
Shakman and Beem balance the interests correctly, the conclusion in
favor of allowing confidentiality agreements remains correct only so
long as no other clients seek to retain the attorney. Once another client
in fact seeks to retain the attorney’s services, the attorney may not
represent that client, pursuant to Rule 1.7(b), without first obtaining full
informed consent from the new client. As already noted, that consent
will prove difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Even if the attorney can
obtain the consent, the attorney must still objectively determine whether
the withholding of the strategy will substantively affect the client’s tax or
estate plan. As already noted, this will also prove difficult, if not
impossible, to overcome. If the attorney’s entire practice consists of tax

71. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 93-371 (1993)).
72. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 1.
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and estate planning, then this confidentially agreement may in fact
utterly limit to the attorney to one client for whom the attorney signed
the agreement, and for the entire duration of the agreement. If the
agreement requires indefinite confidentiality, then the attorney may find
that her career has disappeared. This result clearly violates Rule 5.6.
The second policy concern behind Rule 5.6, the “desire of the
defendant to ‘buy off’ plaintiff’s counsel,”73 seems to arise more out of
the litigation model of attorney representation than from a planning or
transactional model.74 Nevertheless, attorney self-dealing may remain a
possibility even outside of the litigation setting. Thus, the potential
harms to the public interest in the form of restricting the free-flow of
legal advice, the potential for attorney self-dealing, and the potential
conflicts with future clients’ interests all combine to present a powerful
argument against permitting attorneys to sign confidentiality agreements
in this context. Thus, Shakman and Beem’s ethical analysis focuses
inappropriately only on the ethical duties of the attorney to her clients,
neglecting the ethical duty which the attorney owes to “the system” as a
whole.
Ordinarily, in performing his duty to the client, the lawyer carries out
his duty to the system well. There are times, however, when the
lawyer, while pursuing his client’s interests competently, loyally, and
discreetly, must hold himself and his client’s interests in check in order
to perform the less defined, and seemingly contradictory duty which he
owes to the system as a whole.75

The second error in Shakman and Beem’s analysis, that it assumes
the secret strategies promoted by accounting firms have sufficient worth
to the client’s interests, ignores the realities of the tax planning industry,
where few or no tax planners ever develop new strategies entirely
unavailable to the rest of the industry. Further, the analysis ignores the
reality that, even if a firm did develop a new strategy, the firm could not
protect the strategy for long.76 Even if the firm could protect the
strategy’s secrecy, the firm would struggle to place an attorney under a
binding confidentiality agreement.

73. Id.
74. “[The] Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . [are] composed largely of general,
litigation-based rules that do not address many of the difficult problems that arise in specific areas of
practice.” JOHN R. PRICE, J. ET AL, ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 7 (3d ed. 1999).
75. BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAXATION
PRACTICE 1-2 (3d ed. 1995).
76. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 70 (“‘Would my client have to wait another week or another
month or another 90 days?’ [Gibbons] asks. ‘Nothing’s going to hold out much longer than that.’”).
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Thus, the attorney may still serve the present client’s interests, even
without signing the agreement and without purchasing this particular
strategy from this particular accounting firm. After all, seldom do tax
planners find only one perfect solution to their clients’ problems to all
exclusion of other possible and comparatively beneficial strategies. Of
course, these realities make most confidentiality agreements more
irrelevant than unethical. However, even in a case where the accounting
firm has something of real value to offer, a confidentiality agreement
would unethically restrict the lawyer’s ability to practice law during the
period that the strategy remains a secret.
3. Unauthorized practice of law77
The final ethical dilemma implicated by the hypothesized facts and
addressed by the ISBA opinion arises out of Rule 5.5(b), which prohibits
attorneys from assisting others in the unauthorized practice of law.78
Pursuant to . . . Rule 5.5(b), a lawyer is prohibited from assisting “a
person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity
that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.” We have assumed
that the tax package to be disclosed by Accounting Firm to Client A
contains legal advice or analysis. Although the services performed by
accountants and lawyers do overlap in some areas, there is a line that
can be crossed at some point at which the accountant’s services may
become the “practice of law.”79

Although the opinion does not conclude whether, under these facts,
the attorney assists the accounting firm in the unauthorized practice of
law,80 it suggests that the lawyer who signs such an agreement at least
implicates a Rule 5.5(b) question. American jurisprudence lists the
following activities as the unauthorized practice of law:
Drafting and supervising the execution of wills for others. . . . The
assembling, drafting, execution, and funding of a living trust document
constitutes the practice of law because a living trust document involves
the disposition of property at death and, thus, requires legal expertise;
however, non lawyers may gather the necessary information for the
living trust. One not licensed to practice law who advises a particular
person as to wills, trusts, and other schemes for the conservation and

77. BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX
PRACTICE 1-2 (3d ed. 1995).
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2002).
79. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b)
(2002)).
80. Id. “Unauthorized practice of law questions are very fact specific and therefore no
opinion can be stated on that issue given the general facts presented in the inquiry.” Id.
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disposition of his or her estate at death, thereby engages in the
unauthorized practice of law, whether such advice is offered as a
separate service or as an incident to carrying on the business of selling
insurance.81
Activities designed to secure tax reductions or refunds for others may
constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Factors that are significant
in determining whether such activity constitutes the practice of law
[include] . . . whether the special knowledge required for the
undertaking is legal or economic. . . . It was intimated, though not
decided, in one case that when an accountant deals with a question of
law which is only incidental to preparing a tax return, he or she is not
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. But an accountant may
not as an independent service render opinions regarding tax liability
based on his or her study of authorities in order to construe a tax
statute. Other jurisdictions have rejected the incidental test and have
ruled that an accountant may not give legal advice or do legal work
even in connection with his or her regular work as an accountant in tax
82
matters.

A court’s determination whether the accounting firm’s preparation
and sale of tax-planning strategies constitutes the unauthorized practice
of law depends on a highly fact-specific inquiry.83 However, given the
guidelines and holdings outlined in American Jurisprudence, cited above,
the accounting firm at least sits dangerously on the edge of entering
territory historically reserved only for licensed attorneys.84 If the law of
a given jurisdiction would hold the accounting firm in our fact scenario
to liability for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, then the
ethical rules forbid an attorney to assist the accounting firm in that
practice.85
Assuming that the accounting firm’s practice constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law,86 the final question then rests in whether
81. AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 122 (1997) (citations omitted).
82. AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 126 (1997) (citations omitted).
83. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1 (“Unauthorized practice of law questions are very fact
specific and therefore no opinion can be stated on that issue given the general facts presented in the
inquiry.”)
84. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 122 (Supp. 2002) (“Corporation in business of
creating and selling complex estate planning documents engaged in unauthorized practice of law
when nonlawyer [sic] employees answered customers’ specific legal questions, determined
appropriateness of living trust based on customers’ particular needs and circumstances, assembled,
drafted, and executed documents and funded living trusts; although trust documents were reviewed
by attorneys, employees’ conduct went beyond mere gathering of necessary information.”) See
generally Fla. Bar v. Am. Senior Citizens Alliance, Inc. 689 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1997).
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2002).
86. See generally, LAWS MAN. ON PROF’L CONDUCT (ABA/BNA), 21:8201 for an excellent
discussion of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
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the attorney’s transaction with that firm, in signing a confidentiality
agreement and counseling the client to do the same, constitutes
assistance within the meaning of Rule 5.5(b). If the lawyer’s conduct
does constitute assistance within the meaning of that rule, then the
lawyer may not ethically engage in that transaction.
In summary, the lawyer who signs a confidentiality agreement with
an accounting firm likely violates at least three fundamental rules of
ethics. The lawyer violates Rule 1.7(b) by creating unethical conflicts of
interest between the current clients. Such conflicts arise because the
attorney no longer has the ability to bring all her knowledge and ability
to bear on the problems of the clients for whom the attorney did not enter
into a confidentiality agreement. The attorney also violates Rule 5.6(b)
by restricting her ability to practice law and creating conflicts of interest
with future clients. While some debate continues regarding the relevance
of the policies underlying Rule 5.6(b) in the tax-planning context, the
rule nevertheless stands as an ethical barrier to the attorney signing such
an agreement. Further, the polices underlying Rule 5.6(b) may still play
an important role in securing the public interest beyond future clients’
interests. Finally, the lawyer may violate Rule 5.6(b) by assisting the
accounting firm in the unauthorized practice of law. While the legal
profession may incrementally loosen this standard as multi-disciplinary
practice becomes more common and more acceptable, this ethical
standard nevertheless remains relevant and binding authority. No
general rule appears readily available to determine whether under the
hypothesized facts the attorney violates this rule. Attorneys should
therefore carefully consider this ethical rule when trying to decide
whether to sign a confidentially agreement with an accounting firm.
C. Third-Party Beneficiaries of Secrets
Allowing attorneys to sign confidentiality agreements with respect to
proprietary tax-planning strategies would result in at least one
devastating result: third-party beneficiary liability to the proprietor.
Many jurisdictions, in protecting proprietors’ interests in trade secrets,
imposes a duty upon third parties who benefit from the defendant’s
misappropriation of the idea to know whether the idea they are
purchasing from the defendant constitutes a protected trade secret.87 In
these jurisdictions, if the third party knew or should have known that the
defendant misappropriated the idea the third party purchased from the
87. See Metallurical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1204 (5th Cir. 1986) (“The
law imposes liability not only on those who wrongfully misappropriate trade secrets by breach of
confidence but also, in certain situations, on others who might benefit from the breach.”). Rule
10.9(a).
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defendant, then a court will impose liability on the third party as well as
the defendant.88
One who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to
do so, is liable to the other if . . . (c) he learned the secret from a third
person with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that the third
person’s disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the
other. . .
One has notice of facts under the rule stated in this Section when he
knows of them or when he should know of them. . . . He should know
of them if, from the information which he has, a reasonable man would
infer the facts in question or if, under the circumstances, a reasonable
man would be put on inquiry and under an inquiry pursued with
89
reasonable intelligence and diligence would disclose the facts.

This puts an enormous burden on the third party, because she must
become judge and jury to determine whether the direct defendant stole
the secret obtained it legitimately.90
In our facts, third-party liability means that all tax-planning clients
and potential clients must always inquire of their attorney whether the
attorney misappropriated any proprietary strategies for the clients’
benefit. Third-party liability also means, however, that where the client
knows or should know the attorney has confidential dealings with
accounting firms, the clients must inquire of those accounting firms
whether the strategies the attorney proposes constitutes proprietary trade
secrets owned by the accounting firms.91
Allowing attorneys to enter into confidential relationships with
accounting firms regarding secret tax-planning strategies creates two
serious problems in the third-party beneficiary context. First, third-party
liability creates a highly charged, potentially litigious atmosphere where
seeking legal advice may expose clients and their attorneys to liability in
tort. Second, such exposure creates an additional restraint on the
attorney’s ability to practice law by providing a strong disincentive for
clients to seek legal advice. As already noted, Rule 5.6 deals with
attorneys entering into relationships that limit their ability to practice
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. 1 (1939)).
90. For this idea, I am indebted to Professor Jean Burns. Professor Burns proposed this idea
during a lecture on February 29, 2002 regarding Metallurgical Industries, Inc. v. Fourtek as a
problem inherent in third-party beneficiary liability in trade secrets law. She did not apply this idea
directly to the problem at hand, although if the proposition applies in general trade secrets law, then
it probably will apply in this context as well.
91. Metallurgical Indus. Inc., 790 F.2d at 1204 (“[I]n attention to possible wrongdoing . . .
amounts to a failure to reasonably inquire into the facts involved. . . . [The third-party defendant]
might therefore be held accountable, provided it used any trade secrets conveyed.”).
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law.92 Whether or not the contractual relationship between the attorney
and the accounting firm directly violates Rule 5.6, the disincentive
created by that relationship seems to further violate “the spirit of Rule
5.6” by potentially freezing the free flow of competent legal advice.
IV. CONCLUSION
As presently constituted, the laws of trade secrets and contracts and
the rules of attorney ethics largely disfavor both trade secret protection
for tax-planning strategies and confidentiality agreements between
attorneys and accounting firms. Accounting firms will struggle to prove
that tax-planning strategies amount to novel ideas that meet the definition
of trade secrets. This struggle arises out of both evidentiary problems in
proving novelty and from the economic realities of the industry, both of
which make tax strategies unlikely candidates to receive trade secrets
protection. Most accounting firms seem to recognize the uncertain
ground on which their trade secrets claims stand, and therefore, attempt
to impose duties of confidentiality on clients and clients’ attorneys.
However, these confidential relationships and confidentiality contracts
stand on perhaps even shakier ground than the trade secrets claims. The
confidential relationships claims suffer from the same problem as the
trade secrets claims. More importantly, the confidentiality agreements
likely fail to satisfy both definiteness requirements and consideration
requirements at the same time.
Even if the law will enforce such agreements, attorneys may not sign
them because of three fundamental attorney ethics rules. These
agreements violate Rule 1.7(b) by creating conflicts of interest between
the attorney’s clients; they violate Rule 5.6(b) by restricting the
attorney’s ability to practice law; and they may violate Rule 5.5(b) by
obligating the attorney to assist the accounting firm in the unauthorized
practice of law. If an accounting firm can prove the existence of a trade
secret, prove the existence of an enforceable contract, and show that the
contract does not force the attorney into violating ethical rules, one last
problem remains. The potential consequences of protecting tax-planning
strategies by imposing trade secrets law, by allowing attorneys to enter
confidentiality agreements, and by enforcing those contracts should
seriously harm the public interest by imposing third-party liability on
clients and potential clients. This liability contradict both the spirit of
Rule 5.6 and the public good generally by providing a severe
disincentive for clients to seek counsel, thus freezing the free flow of
competent legal advice.
92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2002).
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Ultimately, the laws of trade secrets and contracts, as well as the
rules of attorney ethics seek to promote the public interest and to protect
all parties’ substantive legal rights. To the extent that accounting firms
prove successful in enforcing confidentiality agreements, the public
interest and clients’ rights suffer. As demonstrated above, however, the
law and rules as presently constituted already protect the public from
these undesirable consequences. The tax bar must continue to inquire,
however, into the inevitable developments of multi-disciplinary practice,
the consequences of those developments, and the changes the law must
make to accommodate the public interest in that context. Such an
inquiry, however, must not ignore the considerations outlined in this
comment in order to accommodate multi-disciplinary practice. Instead,
such an inquiry should seek to develop multi-disciplinary practice in
ways consistent with the whole body of trade secrets law, contract law,
and ethical rules.
Andrew Franklin Peterson

